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A vast number of workers in developing economies find employment opportunities 
in the informal sector such as self-employment, home businesses, and other small 
enterprises. Since these informal firms are associated with lower profits, productivity, and 
wage payments, the formalization of informal firms has important implications for 
economic development (La Porta and Shleifer, 2014). However, prior work provides 
mixed evidence for the benefits of formalization on firm performance. Experimental 
studies provide informal businesses incentives to register with the government and find a 
relatively small effect of formalization on the performance (de Mel et al., 2013; De Giorgi 
and Rahman, 2013; Benhassine et al., 2018). Meanwhile, other non-experimental studies 
tend to find positive effects (McKenzie and Sakho, 2010; Fajnzylber et al., 2011; Rand 
and Torm, 2012; Demenet et al., 2016; Boly, 2018), whereas McCaig and Nanowski 
(2019) find no evidence of formalization benefits for household businesses in Vietnam. 
Thus, there remains an open question of whether formality improves firm performance. 
In this paper, I seek to estimate the causal impact of formal registration on informal 
firms by using previously unexplored panel data in Cambodia. Specifically, I use the 
Economic Census of Cambodia (ECC) in 2011 for a baseline dataset. The ECC surveys 
all nonfarm establishments and enterprises over the entire territory of Cambodia, without 
any establishment-size threshold. For a post period, I use the Inter-censal Economic 
Survey of Cambodia (ESC) in 2014, which is a nationally representative survey based on 
a stratified multistage sampling method. Using survey information on registration with 
the Cambodian Ministry of Commerce, I define formal (informal) firms as establishments 
with (without) a formal registration. By linking 504,955 establishments in the ECC with 
12,178 establishments in the ESC, I construct panel data for 9,022 firms. For my analysis, 
I focus on a sample of 8,350 informal firms in 2011, of which 216 firms obtained a formal 
registration in 2014. 
To estimate a causal impact of formalization on firm outcomes, I adopt a standard 
difference-in-differences (DID) method, which measures formalization effects by 
comparing changes in outcomes for formalized firms during the 2011-2014 period with 
changes in outcomes for non-formalized firms during the same period. A key  issue for 
identification is that formalized firms may systematically differ from non-formalized 
firms in various aspects, which may affect both a formalization decision and firm 
outcomes. To mitigate possible selection bias in the DID estimate of formalization effects, 
I combine propensity-score matching (PSM) with the DID method (Heckman et al., 1997; 
Smith and Todd, 2005). Nevertheless, the PSM-DID method still makes it difficult to 
control for unobserved industry and region shocks and to examine an interactive effect of 
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formalization on other firm characteristics. To address both these issues and selection bias, 
I also employ a propensity-score-weighted (PSW) regression method (Hirano et al., 2003). 
My results show that formal registration has a significantly positive impact on sales 
and value added for informal firms. The PSW results indicate that formalized firms 
increased their sales by 161% and their value added by 151%. These impacts are 
significantly smaller for self-employed informal firms. The impact of formalization on 
profits is significantly positive only for informal firms with more than one worker. I do 
not find evidence that formalization improves labor productivity across firm types. 
Additionally, I examine channels through which formalization improves performance by 
estimating the effect of formalization on intermediate outcomes. Formalization increases 
non-wage expenditures significantly, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
formalized firms increase their purchases from other formal firms to benefit from 
Cambodia’s value added tax system. Formalization also increases wage payments and the 
number of regularly employed workers, but has little impact on the number of family 
workers. This suggests that an increase in wage payments for formal workers is an 
important source of formalization effects for economic development. 
Prior empirical literature uses experimental and observational data to estimate 
formalization benefits for informal firms. Experimental studies use a sample of firms in 
large cities in Sri Lanka (de Mel et al., 2013) and Benin (Benhassine et al., 2018). 
Observational studies use firm-level and household-level surveys in developing 
economies such as Bolivia, Brazil, and Vietnam (McKenzie and Sakho, 2010; Fajnzylber 
et al., 2011; Rand and Torm, 2012; Demenet et al., 2016; Boly, 2018; McCaig and 
Nanowski, 2019). Baseline surveys in these studies are not based on a nationally 
representative sample frame that covers both formal and informal firms, suggesting that 
previous results may suffer from sampling bias if surveys contain a biased set of informal 
firms that became formal in specific regions. In this respect, this paper is the first to 
exploit a baseline dataset that surveys all nonfarm establishments and enterprises over the 
entire territory in an economy, which serves as a sample frame for a post-period survey. 
My comprehensive data allow me to address the sampling issue, thereby providing 
credible external validity for my results in the case of Cambodia. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the formal 
registration system in Cambodia, followed by discussing costs and benefits for informal 
firms to obtain a formal registration. Section 3 explains my empirical strategy to identify 
the impact of formalization on firm outcomes. Section 4 describes data sources, data 
construction, and sample characteristics. Section 5 discusses the estimation results. 




2. Formal registration in Cambodia 
This section describes the formal registration system in Cambodia and explains the 
costs and benefits for informal firms to obtain a formal registration. The Cambodian 
government established a regulatory framework for commercial enterprises in the “Law 
Bearing upon Commercial Regulations and the Commercial Register,” which was 
enacted in 1995 and amended in 1999. This law defines the meaning of commercial 
enterprises and stipulates the obligation of firms to register, with a description of formal 
registration procedures. The National Assembly in Cambodia adopted the “Law on 
Commercial Enterprise” in 2005, which applies to partnerships, private limited 
companies, public limited companies, and foreign businesses. 
To establish a formal enterprise under Cambodian law, firms must register with the 
Ministry of Commerce or the Provincial Department of Commerce. Specifically, 
registration procedures require firms to (i) provide the registrar with the specific location 
of the office and the name of its agent; (ii) deposit a legally required initial capital in a 
bank and submit evidence of the deposit; (iii) check the uniqueness of the company name 
at the Intellectual Property Department and the Business Registration Office; and (iv) 
publish an abstract of the company organization documents and incorporate the company 
with the Business Registration Department in the Ministry of Commerce (World Bank, 
2014). During the study period, the procedure costs are estimated to require at least 400 
USD. The estimated time to complete the registration is at least one month. However, in 
practice, these registration procedures are typically complex and may require lengthy 
steps to negotiate with government officials, who may delay an application to seek 
facilitating payments. To reduce application time and administration costs, firms may 
need to seek expert advisory services from company registration agents. Taken together, 
the up-front costs of formal registration include formal registration fees, time costs of 
registration processes, and administrative costs for government officials. 
Formal registration can yield benefits for firms in several ways. First, formal 
registration enables firm owners to conduct business activities as a legally established 
enterprise. This legal framework improves the formal management of corporate activities 
and reduces uncertainty costs in future business planning and potential commercial 
disputes. Documents on corporate registration are typically necessary to obtain official 
licenses and business approvals from related government ministries. Administrative and 
legal validity is a key benefit of the formal registration for commercial operations. Second, 
the formal registration can reduce possible fines that may be levied during an inspection 
if the business is not properly registered. Nevertheless, this does not imply that 
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unregistered firms are advantageous in avoiding tax payments. The tax systems for 
business in Cambodia as of the year 2011 consisted of real and estimated regimes. 
Specifically, registered firms must pay their tax based on their real income, whereas 
unregistered firms need to pay taxes based on their estimated income. Because a vast 
number of unregistered firms do not properly register with the tax authority, tax officials 
visit individual establishments to calculate taxable income based on their estimated 
income and receive tax payments at the site. 
Third, formal registration enables firm owners to claim tax credits for their purchases 
from registered suppliers, which generate tax benefits for formally registered firms (de 
Paula and Scheinkman, 2010). In the case of Cambodia, formally registered firms must 
register with the General Department of Taxation to obtain the identification number of 
value added tax (VAT). They must charge VAT on their sales and issue VAT invoices that 
contain the VAT identification numbers of suppliers and buyers. With proper VAT 
invoices, registered firms can offset the VAT paid on their purchases against the VAT paid 
on their sales. However, if suppliers do not have the VAT identification number, registered 
firms cannot claim tax credits for their purchases from the unregistered suppliers. Thus, 
the formal registration is a first step for firms to gain tax benefits from business 
transactions with other registered firms. Consistent with this explanation, McKenzie and 
Sakho (2010) highlight the VAT benefits of tax registration in Bolivia. 
Fourth, formal registration can help firms to gain better access to formal credit 
(Straub, 2005). Although unregistered businesses do not typically record a precise flow 
of commercial operations in an accounting book, formally registered firms must have a 
proper record of their business operations. Accounting records on assets and operations 
serve as credible documentation for formal lenders to evaluate business risk and 
repayment rates of loan applications. Financial screening helps formal firms to access 
long-term capital under reasonable interest rates, thereby supporting the growth of their 
commercial operations. However, it should be highlighted that formal registration may 
not be a pre-requisite for access to formal credit in developing economies with a weak 
legal system. In the case of Cambodia, local legal institutions in business law and the 
court system typically do not provide adequate protection of lenders’ interests, and thus 
formal banks typically require collateral for loans. These lenders visit borrowers’ business 
sites to inspect and register their land and building. Because these assets are generally 
registered in the names of individual business owners, rather than corporate entities, 
banks prefer to lend to individuals, rather than corporations (Harner, 2003; Ung and Hay, 
2011). For these reasons, formal registration may not substantially improve access to 
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formal credit, as is consistent with the weak evidence of formalization effects on credit 
access (McKenzie and Sakho, 2010; Rand and Torm, 2012). 
 In sum, informal firms seeking formal registration must pay registration fees, 
spend time in the process, and incur administrative costs in registration. Meanwhile, 
registration allows them to benefit from legal consistency, a lower likelihood of fines, tax 
credits in the VAT system, and improved access to formal credit. A registration decision 
should depend on these costs and benefits; i.e., greater benefits would induce informal 
firms to obtain a formal registration, whereas larger costs would discourage them from 
registering with the government. However, this analysis of registration decisions does not 
answer the question of whether informal firms improve their performance after formal 
registration. It is also unclear which performance measures would change after 
registration. To address these questions, I proceed to estimate formalization effects on 
informal firms in Cambodia. 
 
3. Empirical strategy 
3.1. Benchmark model 
To examine the impact of formalization on firm performance, I specify an empirical 
model for firm i, industry s, region r, and year t: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (1) 
where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a measure of business performance for firm i in year t. Outcome variables 
include sales, value added, gross profits, and labor productivity. Since the sample includes 
only firms that were initially unregistered in 2011, 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  takes on unity for 
registered firm i in 2014, and zero otherwise. 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 is a firm-level fixed effect to control for 
unobserved firm heterogeneity such as owners’ age, sex, ability, and education. Other 
fixed effects, 𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖 and 𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖 , are included to control for unobserved time-varying 
effects in industry s and region r of firm i, respectively; these include any demand, supply, 
and technology shocks across industries and regions for any year. Finally, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is an error 
term. 
The coefficient of interest is 𝛽𝛽 for measuring the causal impact of formalization on 
outcomes. The identification is based on a standard DID method. Specifically, I exploit 
two sources of variations in outcomes: (1) a difference in outcomes between formalized 
and non-formalized firms, and (2) a difference in outcomes between pre- and post- 
periods. By comparing changes in outcomes for formalized firms during the 2011-2014 
period with changes in outcomes for non-formalized firms during the same period, the 
DID method gives an estimate of the causal impact of formalization. Because firm 
outcomes depend on a variety of economic factors, a wide range of fixed effects helps to 
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isolate potential confounding factors from the causal impact on firm outcomes. 
Additionally, the DID method assumes that outcomes for both formalized and non-
formalized firms would exhibit parallel trends in the absence of obtaining a formal 
registration in 2014. 
 
3.2. Propensity-score matching and weighting 
A key identification issue in the benchmark model is that registration decisions are 
not random. Formalized firms may systematically differ from non-formalized firms in 
various aspects, which may affect both the formalization decision and firm outcomes. 
Non-random selection can violate the parallel trends assumption, implying that the DID 
estimate of formalization effects may suffer from selection bias. To address this issue, I 
combine PSM with the DID method (Heckman et al, 1997; Smith and Todd, 2005). The 
PSM method computes propensity scores to match formalized firms with similar non-
formalized firms based on the closest propensity score.1 Using a matched sample, the 
DID method compares a change in performance between formalized firms and similar 
non-formalized firms. With the PSM-DID method, I can balance the distributions of 
observed characteristics between formalized and non-formalized firms to reduce potential 
selection bias due to unobserved heterogeneity between treatment and control groups. 
To estimate a propensity score for formalization, I specify a logit model in a first stage 
for firm i and base year 𝑡𝑡0: 
𝑃𝑃𝐹𝐹(𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝑓𝑓�𝑿𝑿′𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖0𝜹𝜹 + 𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖0 + 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖0 + 𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖�   (2) 
where 𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 takes on unity if firm i obtains a formal registration in 2014, and zero otherwise. 
𝑿𝑿𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖0 is a vector of firm-level characteristics in the base year 𝑡𝑡0 . These include log 
employment size, business area index, firm age, a dummy variable for female 
representative, a dummy for proprietorship, and a dummy for rented business place. 
𝑑𝑑𝑠𝑠(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖0  is a vector of base-year variables on industry-level characteristics for firm i, 
including the share of formal firms’ employment in aggregate industry employment and 
dummy variables for major industrial sectors such as manufacturing, wholesale/retail, 
accommodation/restaurant, and education. 𝑑𝑑𝑟𝑟(𝑖𝑖),𝑖𝑖0  is a dummy variable that takes on 
unity if firm i operates in Phnom Penh, the capital province of Cambodia, during a base 
year. Using the estimated propensity scores from equation (2), I match each firm to a 
single firm with the opposite treatment whose propensity score is closest. Taking the 
average of the difference between observed and counterfactual outcome changes for each 
firm, I compute an average treatment effect of formalization on the treated. 
                                                   
1 There are alternative matching methods, and (dis)advantages over alternative methods are discussed 
in Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) and Khandker et al. (2010). 
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A PSM-DID method provides a useful solution to address selection bias in a 
formalization decision, but it is subject to at least two issues for my analysis. First, it is 
difficult to control for time-varying industry and regional effects. The local average 
treatment effect based on the PSM-DID method may contain unobserved time-varying 
shocks across industries and regions. Second, formalization effects may depend on other 
firm characteristics such as self-employment. The average treatment effect may mask an 
important interactive effect of formalization on other firm characteristics. 
An alternative approach to address both selection bias and these issues is to use a 
PSW regression method (Hirano et al., 2003). In the first stage, I estimate the logit model 
in equation (2) to compute a propensity score for firm i. The inverse of propensity scores 
is used to construct weights for formalized and non-formalized firms in common support. 
By applying more weight to firms with a higher propensity score, the PSW method 
achieves a balance in covariates between formalized and non-formalized firms in a 
regression framework of equation (1). However, estimation results may be sensitive to 
some observations with extremely large (small) weights in the PSW method. I address 
this issue by excluding observations with the top and bottom 5% of estimated propensity 
scores in the distribution. In addition, the regression framework allows me to control for 
time-varying industry and regional effects in the PSW estimation and compute an 
interaction effect of formalization. 
Finally, I highlight that a propensity-score method estimates a causal impact of 
formalization effects under assumptions, as shown in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). The 
first assumption is conditional independence that potential outcomes are independent of 
treatment assignment, conditional on observable pre-treatment covariates. In my setting, 
this suggests that firm outcomes are independent of formalization decisions, conditional 
on observed firm characteristics during a pre-formalization period. In practice, there may 
exist unobserved time-varying firm characteristics that affect the formalization decision 
and outcomes simultaneously, which would cause a bias in estimated formalization 
effects in an unknown direction and magnitude (McCaig and Nanowski, 2019). The 
second assumption is the presence of common support. This implies sufficient overlap of 
the distribution of propensity scores between formalized and non-formalized firms to 
ensure a match for formalized firms. 
 
4. Data description 
4.1. Data sources 
My main dataset is constructed from the ECC in 2011 and the ESC in 2014. These 
surveys were funded by Japanese official development assistance and implemented by 
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the National Institute of Statistics (NIS) in the Cambodian Ministry of Planning. The main 
purpose of the ECC is to survey economic activities of all nonfarm establishments and 
enterprises over the entire territory of Cambodia.2 The survey defines an establishment 
as a unit of economic entity managed by a single ownership in a single physical location 
with some durable facilities. The survey covers all the establishments and enterprises, 
including the street vendors that operate at a fixed location but can move. 3  Census 
enumerators visited each establishment to interview its representative and/or owner and 
fill out a questionnaire through an in-person meeting. The NIS collected all the 
questionnaires for data input and made two data files separately by two data-input 
operators, which are examined for data consistency. 
The ESC is a nationally representative survey based on a stratified multistage 
sampling method. In the first step, all establishments with 50 persons or more are selected. 
The sample includes 1,619 establishments and approximately 508,000 workers, 
accounting for 0.32% of the total number of establishments and 30.3% of the total number 
of workers in the ECC. In the second step, a stratified multistage sampling method is used 
to select small and micro-scale establishment samples. Specifically, enumeration areas 
(EAs) in the ECC are stratified into three strata according to industrial characteristics. In 
total, 30 EAs are selected from the 6 largest provinces, and 20 EAs are selected from the 
18 other provinces. These sample EAs are allocated to the three strata proportionately in 
terms of the number of EAs in each province, such that 540 EAs are selected and account 
for around 3% of all the EAs in Cambodia. Up to 30 establishments are selected from 
each EA. 
These surveys ask each establishment about whether they register with the Ministry 
of Commerce or the Provincial Department of Commerce. Because the questionnaires 
explicitly indicate that “the form is strictly confidential and used only for the statistical 
purposes and not used for taxation,” the surveys address a concern that some respondents 
may refuse to answer or falsely report if they are concerned that their information is used 
for taxation. Additionally, the registration status does not directly determine tax payments 
in Cambodia, implying little tax incentives to report a false claim on registration status. 
Thus, I define formal firms as the establishments that have a formal registration. Informal 
firms are the establishments that have no formal registration.  
                                                   
2 In a preparation stage for the ECC in 2011, the NIS conducted the establishment listing in Phnom 
Penh for 2006, the establishment survey in Phnom Penh for 2007, and the nation-wide establishment 
listing in 2009. 
3 The survey does not cover the establishments classified into the following categories: (1) agriculture, 
forestry, and fishing, (2) public administration and defense, (3) activities of households as employers, 
(4) activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies, and (5) mobile establishments such as a bike 




4.2. Panel data construction 
Using these datasets, I construct panel data at the establishment-level; the number of 
establishments is 504,955 in the ECC and 12,178 in the ESC. First, the ECC includes the 
serial number of each establishment in a village or enumeration area. I use the geographic 
information and the serial number to generate a unique identification number for every 
establishment in 2011. I use similar establishment information in the ESC to generate a 
unique identification number for every establishment in 2014. In principle, survey 
enumerators for the ESC must assign the same serial number for the same establishments 
listed in the ECC and assign the new serial number for new establishments in the EAs 
after 2011. Thus, I can use the same serial number to link individual establishments in the 
same EAs between 2011 and 2014. 
However, the serial number may be subject to survey errors such as reporting 
mistakes. I exclude matched sample establishments with a large difference between 2011 
and 2014 in terms of the following variables: a change in a 1-digit industry code; more 
than 10 years difference in years of starting business; and possible outliers in employment 
growth rates as defined by the bottom and top 1% of distribution. Removing these 
establishments reduces the risk of linking different establishments incorrectly across 
years. Additionally, the ESC does not track establishments based on contact information, 
implying that the 2014 survey should remove the establishments that had relocated across 
EAs or shut down after 2011. Because contact information in the ESC is not available for 
public access, it is not possible to track relocating establishments. 
Another issue is that linking establishments with the serial number leaves a large 
number of unmatched establishments in the ESC, even after accounting for the new 
entrants that did not exist in the ECC. In particular, a large number of micro 
establishments are unmatched, which may lead to sample selection bias in the analysis. 
A plausible reason is that survey enumerators visited establishments listed in the ECC, 
but did not assign the same serial number in practice. If they assigned incorrect serial 
numbers, I might mistakenly classify these establishments as unmatched. To address this 
issue, I use a record linkage method to match observations between two datasets where 
no perfect key fields exist (Herzog et al., 2007). Using the Stata program, reclink, I 
calculate a matching score for observations based on establishment characteristics such 
as survey areas, legal status, representative gender, and business information. I use the 
matching score to link previously unmatched establishments in the ECC and ESC. Finally, 
I remove observations from the sample that are likely incorrectly matched, based on 




4.3.  Sample characteristics 
Table 1 shows a transition matrix of sample firms between formal and informal status 
during the period 2011 and 2014. 4  Among 9,022 firms, the number of formal and 
informal firms is 672 and 8,350 in 2011, respectively. Among 8,350 informal firms in 
2011, 216 firms became formal in 2014. While the vast majority of informal firms 
remained informal, only a small number of informal firms became formal. From the total 
number of sample firms, 90.2% of informal firms remained informal and 2.4% of 
informal firms became formal. Meanwhile, 5.2% of formal firms remained formal and 
2.3% of formal firms became informal. 
---Table 1 here--- 
By way of comparison, I discuss similar panel data in prior studies, which have a 
slightly different formality definition and sample coverage. Rand and Torm (2012) used 
a survey on Vietnamese manufacturing firms, which includes 1,366 formal and informal 
firms in the sample. In their sample, 10.3% of informal firms became formal and 48.5% 
of informal firms remained informal during the sample period. Meanwhile, Demenet et 
al. (2016) used a survey on Vietnamese firms in the urban area, which includes 1,983 
firms in the sample. Their sample shows that 7.4% of informal firms became formal and 
66.4% of informal firms remained informal. As compared with these surveys, my sample 
has a significantly larger number of firms and a smaller share of formalized (initially 
informal) firms. These differences suggest that the prior surveys may include a 
disproportionately greater share of successful informal businesses because they tend to 
register with the government. In this respect, my survey data should reduce the likelihood 
of oversampling formalized firms and over-estimating formalization effects due to the 
oversampling of successful formalized firms 
Key outcome variables include sales, value added, profits, and labor productivity. 
Value added is measured by sales minus intermediate input. Sales include all income 
gains from operating activities such as selling goods and providing services. Intermediate 
input is computed from expenses minus wages because data on expenses include every 
expense being paid for operating activities such as the purchase of materials for sale, 
instruments for providing services, rent, and employees’ salaries and wages. Profits are 
computed as value added minus wage payments to capture entrepreneurial profits. Labor 
productivity is value added per worker. These variables are defined as a natural logarithm 
of nominal USD values for one month in February 2011 or 2014. 
                                                   
4 Appendix Table 1 presents the number of linked establishments across industries. 
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Table 2 presents the summary statistics of outcome variables for initially informal 
firms in 2011 and 2014. First, formalized firms show higher values in these outcomes 
than non-formalized firms do in 2011. Because informal businesses with better 
performance were likely to register with the government, it is crucial to control for 
selection bias in estimating formalization effects. Second, both formalized and non-
formalized firms show higher values in these outcomes in 2014. These figures imply that 
formalization can improve informal firms’ performance after formal registration. 
However, it is also important to disentangle confounding factors from the causal impact 
of formalization on these outcomes. 
---Table 2 here--- 
5. Estimation results 
5.1. DID estimation 
Table 3 presents the results of my benchmark model by DID estimation. I report 
clustered standard errors at the firm level. In column (1), the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is significant 
and positive, implying that formalized firms increased their sales by 245%.5 Column (2) 
shows that value added increased significantly by 245%, and column (3) suggests that 
profits increased by 139%. In column (4) for labor productivity, the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is 
positive, but not significant. Thus, the benchmark results imply that formalization effects 
are significantly positive for outcomes such as sales, value added, and profits. There is no 
significant impact of formalization on labor productivity. However, the DID results must 
be carefully interpreted because the estimate of positive formalization effects may capture 
selection bias in which informal businesses with better performance choose to obtain a 
formal registration. 
---Table 3 here--- 
 
5.2. Propensity-score matching estimation 
I proceed to address a self-selection issue in this section. Table 4 presents the first-
stage logit estimation of a formalization decision for initially informal firms.6 While my 
primary objective is to achieve a balance in covariates between formalized and non-
formalized firms, the results show key characteristics of the formalization decision. 
Specifically, formalized firms are more likely than non-formalized firms to be larger in 
employment and business area, younger in firm age, managed by a male representative, 
and operated under proprietorship. They also tend to employ a smaller share of family 
workers and use a rented place for business. In terms of industry characteristics, 
                                                   
5 The following marginal effects of formalization is computed as 100 × �exp�?̂?𝛽� − 1�. 
6 Appendix Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the sample for logit estimation. 
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formalized firms tend to belong to industries with a higher share of formal-sector 
employment. Although the results show no significant difference across industrial sectors, 
they tend to be located in Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia. 
---Table 4 here--- 
The first-stage logit estimation gives propensity scores to match each firm to a single 
firm with the opposite treatment whose propensity score is closest. Table 5 shows that 
propensity-score matching significantly improves the balancing in observed baseline 
covariates between formalized and non-formalized firms. Specifically, matching 
substantially reduces the standardized differences in the covariates between formalized 
and non-formalized firms, with their values being sufficiently close to zero (Austin, 2009). 
Table 5 also reports variance ratios in unmatched and matched samples. As compared 
with the unmatched sample, the matched sample shows that the variance ratios in all the 
covariates become closer to one. Thus, matching also improves balancing in the variances 
of baseline covariates between formalized and non-formalized firms.7 
---Table 5 here--- 
Table 6 presents the results of formalization effects by PSM-DID estimation. Column 
(1) shows that the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is significant and positive, implying that formalized 
firms increased their sales by 82.2%. In column (2), the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is also significant 
and positive, implying that formalized firms increased their value added by 99%. Column 
(3) shows a significantly positive coefficient for profits, implying that formalization 
increases entrepreneurial profits by 125%. Additionally, there is no significant impact of 
formalization on labor productivity. These results are qualitatively consistent with the 
benchmark results. A key difference is that the estimated formalization impacts are much 
smaller in the PSM-DID estimation. Because the benchmark model does not explicitly 
control for different distributions of observed baseline covariates between formalized and 
non-formalized firms, selection decisions might generate an upward bias for 
formalization effects in the benchmark model. 
---Table 6 here--- 
 
5.3. Propensity-score-weighted estimation 
Table 7 shows the results by a PSW method, which controls for not only selection 
bias, but unobserved time-varying shocks across industries and regions. Consistent with 
the previous results, columns (1) and (2) show that the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is significant and 
positive for both sales and value added. Specifically, formalized firms increased their 
                                                   
7 Imai et al. (2008) argue that it is incorrect to use hypothesis tests for checking balance because the 
balance is a characteristic of the observed sample, not some hypothetical population. 
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sales by 161% and their value added by 151%. As compared with the estimated effects in 
a PSM-DID method, the PSW method yields larger estimated impacts on sales and value 
added, suggesting that unobserved time-varying effects across industries and regions 
might produce a downward bias in the PSM-DID results. Meanwhile, the estimated 
effects in the PSW method are smaller in magnitude than those in a DID method, 
consistent with the PSM-DID results. In addition, columns (3) and (4) show that the 
coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is not significant for profits and labor productivity. 
---Table 7 here--- 
The PSW estimation suggests that formalized firms increased their sales and value 
added significantly. Their profits and labor productivity did not change significantly when 
compared with similar non-formalized firms. An important question is whether this 
finding is sensitive to data construction and formality definition. A first concern is that 
some establishments may be incorrectly linked in panel data construction and thus drive 
the above results. To check this issue, I exclude the observations in the bottom 5% of 
match scores, which may lead to false matches. Panel A of Appendix Table 3 shows the 
PSW results. I find that the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is significant and positive for sales and value 
added, but not significant for profits and labor productivity. Thus, the main results are 
robust to potentially false matches in panel data construction. 
A second concern is that the finding may be sensitive to the formality definition. 
While formal registration with the Ministry of Commerce is an objective criterion to 
define formalized firms, an alternative definition may better capture a formalization 
process in the informal sector. Specifically, some firms may not register with the Ministry 
of Commerce, but obtain an official license and/or approval from other ministries and 
agencies. Because these firms may also represent formalized firms, the formality 
definition can include formal registration and/or official license. Using this definition of 
formality, I report the PSW results in Panel B of Appendix Table 3. I find that the 
coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is significant and positive for sales and value added, but not significant for 
profits and labor productivity. Thus, the main results are also robust to the alternative 
definition of formalization. 
Discussions up to this point have focused on average formalization effects. 
Formalization effects can be heterogeneous across formalizing firms because informal 
firms and workers are heterogeneous in many respects such as the degree of informality 
(Mazumbar, 1976). For instance, self-employed workers run their subsistence small 
businesses and formal registration may have a smaller impact on their performance than 
on that of larger informal firms. To examine this heterogeneity, Table 8 presents the results 
of the benchmark model including an interaction term between 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and a dummy 
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for initially self-employed ownership. In column (1), the coefficient 𝛽𝛽 is significant and 
positive whereas the coefficient of the interaction term is significant and negative. This 
suggests that the positive impact of formalization on sales is significantly smaller for self-
employed firms. Columns (2) and (3) also show that the positive impact of formalization 
on sales and profits is significantly smaller for self-employed firms. In column (4), the 
coefficients are not significant for both 𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and the interaction term, implying that 
formalization does not improve labor productivity across firm types. 
---Table 8 here--- 
 
5.4. Formalization effects on intermediate outcomes 
The previous results show formalization effects on outcomes, but shed little light on 
possible channels through which formalization affects outcomes. To address this issue, 
this section examines the effect of formalization on intermediate outcomes. Specifically, 
I re-estimate the benchmark model using a PSW method for the following dependent 
variables: the log of non-wage expenditures, wage payments in nominal USD values, an 
index of business area, 8  working days during one month, total workers, regularly 
employed workers, and unpaid family workers. 
Table 9 presents the results for intermediate outcomes. Column (1) shows that the 
coefficient of formalization is significant and positive for non-wage expenditures, 
including intermediate inputs and tax payments. Formalization increases the non-wage 
expenditure by 263%. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that formalized firms 
pay more on their purchases from other formally registered suppliers and benefit from 
Cambodia’s VAT system. In column (2), the coefficient is significant and positive, 
suggesting that formalization increases wage payments by 860 USD. Wage payments for 
workers should be a crucial source of larger value added after formalization. Additionally, 
column (3) shows that the coefficient is significant and positive for the business area 
index, implying that formalized firms significantly expand the area of their business place. 
Given that the size of a business place can be a proxy for capital stock, formalization 
could be associated with an increase in capital input. In column (4), the coefficient is 
significant and positive for working days. Although formalized firms operate longer, the 
estimated coefficient implies an increase of only 0.8 days. 
---Table 9 here--- 
In column (5), the coefficient is significant and positive, suggesting that formalized 
                                                   
8 The area of business place in square meters is classified into nine groups as follows; (1) under 5m2, 
(2) 5m2 to 10m2, (3) 10m2 to 30m2, (4) 30m2 to 50m2, (5) 50m2 to 100m2, (6) 100m2 to 200m2, (7) 
200m2 to 500m2, (8) 500m2 to 1000m2, and (9) over 1000m2. 
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firms increase their total number of workers by 8.3 persons. To examine a composition of 
the employment growth, I examine the effect of formalization on regular and family 
workers in columns (6) and (7), respectively. The results show that the coefficient is 
significant and positive only for regular workers, implying that an increase in regularly 
employed workers is a key source of the employment growth. Consistent with the finding 
in Rand and Torm (2012), formalization is associated positively with formal employment. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Informality is pervasive in developing economies, and the formalization of informal 
businesses is a crucial policy issue for economic development. This paper sheds light on 
formalization benefits by using a unique panel dataset in Cambodia. My baseline dataset 
covers all nonfarm establishments and enterprises over the entire territory of Cambodia, 
without any establishment-size threshold. A post-period survey is nationally 
representative based on a stratified multistage sampling method. After constructing panel 
data for 9,022 firms, I examine a sample of 8,350 informal firms in 2011, out of which 
216 firms obtained a formal registration in 2014. My empirical strategy is to adopt a 
standard DID method as a benchmark model and address econometric issues such as 
selection bias by using propensity-score matching and propensity-score-weighted 
regression methods. 
My results show that formal registration has a significantly positive impact on sales 
and value added for informal firms, with significantly smaller impacts for self-employed 
informal firms. Although formalization has a significantly positive impact on informal 
firms with more than one worker, I do not find evidence that formalization improves labor 
productivity. Formalization also increases non-wage expenditures significantly, which 
supports the hypothesis that formalized firms increase their purchases from other formal 
firms to benefit from Cambodia’s VAT system. Formalization also increases wage 
payments and the number of regularly employed workers, suggesting that positive 
impacts on formal workers are an important source of formalization effects for economic 
development. 
My analysis highlights that only a small number of informal firms become formal in 
Cambodia, but formal registration has a large positive impact on the performance of 
formalized firms. A likely channel is that formalized firms can benefit from the VAT 
system when they participate in supply chains with other formal firms. The reason is that 
formal registration is a prerequisite to obtain a tax identification number, which is used 
to claim tax credits. These results are generally consistent with the existing non-
experimental studies, but are in stark contrast with previous experimental evidence 
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showing small formalization effects. A plausible explanation is that formal registration 
alone could have no direct benefit for firm performance because formalized firms obtain 
a formal registration and increase their business operations with other formal firms at the 
same time. Given that self-registration is a key signal for the high growth of informal 
firms, supporting informal businesses that self-select to register would be more beneficial 
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Table 1. Sample characteristics 
  
Year 2014 
Informal Formal Total 
Year 2011 
Informal 8,134 216 8,350 
 (90.2) (2.4)  
Formal 205 467 672 
 (2.3) (5.2)  
Total 8,339 683 9,022 
Notes: Figures show the number of establishments; parentheses show the percent share of 
total sample firms; Formal is defined as establishments that register with the Ministry of 
Commerce. 
Source: Author's calculation using Economic Census of Cambodia in 2011 and Inter-censal 





Table 2. Descriptive statistics on outcome variables 
  Formalized Firms Non-formalized Firms 
Variable 2011 2014 2011 2014 
Log sales 7.31 8.33 5.94 6.33 
 (1.86) (1.95) (1.30) (1.35) 
 [188] [187] [8,108] [8,116] 
Log value added 6.64 7.62 4.69 5.08 
 (2.13) (1.99) (1.46) (1.50) 
 [174] [172] [7,649] [7,907] 
Log profits 5.97 6.65 4.49 4.87 
 (1.85) (1.86) (1.24) (1.27) 
 [140] [139] [7,257] [7,551] 
Labor productivity 4.53 4.99 4.02 4.33 
 (1.06) (1.10) (1.15) (1.20) 
 [174] [172] [7,649] [7,907] 
Notes: Figures show the mean of corresponding variables, with parentheses for the standard 
deviation and brackets for the number of observations; Formality is defined as establishments 
that registered with the Ministry of Commerce; sales, value added, and profits are measured 





Table 3. DID estimation of formalization effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Sales Value added Profits 
Labor 
productivity 
Formalization 1.24* 1.24* 0.87* 0.022 
 (0.50) (0.55) (0.37) (0.32) 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry-year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Province-year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 16,599 15,902 15,087 15,902 
R-squared 0.12 0.094 0.096 0.098 
Notes: Dependent variables are defined as the log of the corresponding variables; parentheses 
show standard errors that are clustered at the firm-level; each observation is weighted by 
sampling weights in the Inter-censal Economic Survey of Cambodia in 2014; **, *, and + 





Table 4. First-stage logit estimation of formalization 
Dependent: dummy for formalizing firms 
  (1) 
Variable Coef. Std. Err. 
Log employment size 0.31** (0.076) 
Business area index 0.36** (0.059) 
Age -0.020+ (0.011) 
Female representative -0.70** (0.18) 
Proprietorship 1.23** (0.39) 
Family worker share -1.05** (0.33) 
Rented place 0.52** (0.19) 
Formal sector share 2.22** (0.38) 
Manufacturing -0.17 (0.28) 
Wholesale/retail -0.29 (0.28) 
Accommodation/restaurant 0.43 (0.30) 
Education -0.27 (0.32) 
Phnom Penh 0.42* (0.20) 
Constant -6.24** (0.55) 
No. of observations 8,350 
Pseudo R-squared 0.25 
Notes: Parentheses show robust standard errors; all explanatory variables are measured using 






Table 5. Balancing between treatment and control groups 
  Standardized differences Variance ratio 
Variable Unmatched Matched Unmatched Matched 
Log employment size 0.885 0.013 3.969 1.051 
Business area index 0.989 -0.036 1.944 0.918 
Age 0.300 -0.048 1.435 0.855 
Female representative -0.682 -0.048 0.907 0.962 
Proprietorship -0.536 0.074 2.889 0.932 
Family worker share -0.502 -0.024 0.684 0.956 
Rented place 0.199 0.000 1.462 1.000 
Formal sector share 0.664 -0.029 3.107 0.923 
Manufacturing 0.207 0.000 1.507 1.000 
Wholesale/retail -0.856 0.081 0.792 1.113 
Accommodation/restaurant 0.227 -0.014 1.565 0.979 
Education 0.437 -0.069 3.061 0.907 
Phnom Penh 0.284 -0.029 1.883 0.956 





Table 6. PSM-DID estimation of formalization effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Sales Value added Profits 
Labor 
productivity 
Formalization 0.60** 0.69** 0.81** 0.17 
 (0.14) (0.14) (0.23) (0.13) 
No. of observations 8,282 7,633 7,132 7,633 
Notes: Dependent variables are defined as a change in the log of the corresponding variables 
between years 2011 and 2014; parentheses show Abadie-Imbens robust standard errors; **, *, 





Table 7. PSW estimation of formalization effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Sales Value added Profits 
Labor 
productivity 
Formalization 0.96** 0.92** 0.45 -0.18 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.37) (0.23) 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry-year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Province-year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 15,010 14,348 13,765 14,348 
R-squared 0.29 0.25 0.19 0.14 
Notes: Parentheses show standard errors that are clustered at the firm-level; each observation 
is weighted by sampling weights in the Inter-censal Economic Survey of Cambodia in 2014; 





Table 8. PSW estimation of heterogeneous formalization effects 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Sales Value added Profits 
Labor 
productivity 
Formalization 1.35** 1.18** 0.91** 0.016 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.23) 
Formalization × self-employed -0.97* -0.71+ -1.00* -0.54 
 (0.39) (0.39) (0.50) (0.41) 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Industry-year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
Province-year fixed effects Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 15,010 14,348 13,765 14,348 
R-squared 0.31 0.26 0.21 0.15 
Notes: Parentheses show standard errors that are clustered at the firm-level; each observation 
is weighted by sampling weights in the Inter-censal Economic Survey of Cambodia in 2014; 





Table 9. PSW estimation of intermediate outcomes 
















Formalization 1.29** 859.9** 2.26** 0.79** 8.28** 8.12** 0.17 
 (0.23) (243.5) (0.35) (0.30) (1.77) (1.64) (0.28) 
Firm fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry-year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Province-year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 14,711 15,010 15,026 15,006 15,026 15,026 15,026 
R-squared 0.31 0.42 0.48 0.13 0.48 0.46 0.21 
Mean of dependent variable 5.55 154.3 3.11 26.7 3.17 2.49 1.73 
Notes: Parentheses show standard errors that are clustered at the firm-level; each observation is weighted by sampling weights in the Inter-censal 






Appendix Table 1. The Number of establishments by industry 
  Data 
Panel 
Industry Year 2011 Year 2014 
Manufacturing 71,416 1,899 1,208 
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 4,607 106 48 
Water supply; sewerage, waste management 461 41 8 
Construction 188 17 6 
Wholesale and retail trade 292,350 6,437 5,285 
Transportation and storage 1,557 43 21 
Accommodation and food service activities 69,662 1,489 1,061 
Information and communication 4,711 62 40 
Financial and insurance activities 3,584 150 69 
Real estate activities 120 4 1 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 957 14 3 
Administrative and support service activities 6,023 146 70 
Education 9,874 726 567 
Human health and social work activities 4,885 174 107 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 1,780 65 35 
Other service activities 32,780 805 493 
Total 504,955 12,178 9,022 
Notes: Panel indicates the number of establishments that are linked between 2011 and 2014. 
Source: Economic Census of Cambodia in 2011 and Inter-censal Economic Survey of  





Appendix Table 2. Summary statistics of the sample for logit estimation 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Formalization 8,350 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Log employment size 8,350 0.71 0.98 0 6.85 
Business area (index) 8,350 3.17 2.06 1 9.00 
Age 8,350 8.45 8.18 1 33 
Female representative 8,350 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Proprietorship 8,350 0.92 0.27 0 1 
Family worker share 8,350 0.26 0.27 0 0.83 
Rented place 8,350 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Formal sector share 8,350 0.11 0.16 0.012 0.96 
Manufacturing 8,350 0.12 0.32 0 1.00 
Wholesale/retail 8,350 0.62 0.49 0 1 
Accommodation/restaurant 8,350 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Education 8,350 0.06 0.24 0 1 





Appendix Table 3. Robustness checks 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Sales Value added Profits 
Labor 
productivity 
Panel A: Match Quality of Panel ID 
Formalization 0.34* 0.48* 0.092 -0.22 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.41) (0.35) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 14,442 13,815 13,238 13,815 
R-squared 0.23 0.20 0.18 0.16 
Panel B: Alternative Definition of Formality 
Formalization 0.79** 0.65** 0.14 -0.26 
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.41) (0.28) 
Controls Y Y Y Y 
No. of observations 13,625 13,116 13,078 13,116 
R-squared 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.15 
Notes: Controls include firm-fixed effects, industry-year fixed effects, and province-year 
fixed effects; parentheses show standard errors that are clustered at the firm-level;  
formalizing firms in panel B are those that obtained formal registration with the Ministry of 
Commerce and/or official license from other ministries and agencies in 2014; each 
observation is weighted by sampling weights in the Inter-censal Economic Survey of 
Cambodia in 2014; **, *, and + indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 
